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We provide empirical evidence of the post-investment performance and survivorship profile of angel- 
backed companies, filling a long-standing gap within the entrepreneurial finance literature. Using a 
unique database of 111 angel-backed companies that received angel investments between 2008 and 2012 
and at least 3 years of post-investment financial data, we develop an innovative performance metric and 
show that the performance and the probability of survival of investee companies are positively affected 
by the presence of angel syndicates and the hands-on involvement of business angels, while they are 
negatively related to the intensity of angel monitoring and the time structure of equity provision. Our 
results are robust to several endogeneity tests and provide insights on the multifaceted contributions of 
angel investors to the performance and survival of new ventures. 
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c  1. Introduction 
Market data at both the US and European levels (US ACA, 2016;
Kraemer-Eis et al., 2016; OECD, 2016; Invest Europe, 2017; EBAN,
2017 ) provide evidence of the growing and significant relevance
of Business Angels (BAs) as a main provider of capital to startup
companies. BAs have filled the so-called “funding gap” existing be-
tween the demand and supply of early-stage equity capital, thus
promoting entrepreneurship and economic growth ( Mason and
Harrison, 20 0 0; Sohl, 2012; Capizzi, 2015 ). Despite their economic
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0378-4266/© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. nvestments backed by business angels. This lack of knowledge is
omparable to the status of venture capital research prior to the
eminal Sahlman (1990) study. 
One major factor affecting the quality of the research is the
vailability of data given the opaqueness of the market and
he generally narrow representativeness of survey-based samples
 Harrison and Mason, 2008; Capizzi, 2015; Lerner et al., 2016 ).
dditionally, performance studies are further limited by the se-
ere lack of data on private companies in most countries. As a re-
ult, contributions investigating the performance of angel-backed
ompanies primarily rely on anecdotal or case-based evidence
 Hellman et al., 2013; Kerr et al., 2014; Mason et al., 2016 ). Thus,
t is difficult to find empirical confirmation for some emerging
rends in the informal venture capital markets as well as in busi-
ess angels’ investment process ( Carpentier and Suret, 2015; Land-
tröm and Mason, 2016; Lerner et al., 2016; Harrison and Mason,
017; Bonini et al., 2018 ). As for the former, the rising relevance
f the phenomena of syndicated angel investments alongside the
rofessionalization and growth all over the world of Business An-
el Networks (BAN) do constitute a strong motivation for investi-
ating their possible impact on target companies’ performance. As
or the latter, reference is made to peculiar angel investment prac-
ices, when compared to venture capitalists’ ones, in terms of cap-
tal infusion, contractual provisioning, monitoring mechanisms and
ost-investment involvement. 
S. Bonini, V. Capizzi and P. Zocchi / Journal of Banking and Finance 100 (2019) 328–345 329 
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a  In this paper, we fill this research gap by relying on a unique
atabase containing qualitative and quantitative information on
90 deals made by 380 business angels on roughly firms, during
he period 2008–2012. Matching deals with survivorship and finan-
ial performance information up to 3 years after the investment,
e obtain a sample of 111 angel-backed companies invested in be-
ween 2008 and 2012, on which we perform a comprehensive set
f post-investment analyses. 
Differently from a previous paper focusing on the determinants
f BAs’ investment decisions ( Bonini et al., 2018 ), our main unit
f analysis is the investee company, which we relate to specific
As’ traits, investment style and background to identify the an-
el investment mix of monetary and non-monetary contributions
hat ultimately positively affects the value creation potential of
he target venture itself. This is a particularly relevant research
uestion in the light of the conflicting empirical findings about
he sources of added value provided by institutional investors and
usiness angels in particular to their target companies ( Hellman
nd Puri, 2002; Dimov and Shepherd, 20 05; Hsu, 20 06; Sørensen,
007; Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Chemmanur et al., 2011; Croce
t al., 2013 ). 
A critical methodological issue implied by our research program
s the selection of an accurate set of metrics to measure perfor-
ance. The extant literature looking at the impact of venture capi-
alists on the performance of portfolio companies generally adopts
s measures of performance either measures based on financial di-
ensions such as turnover, market share, and capital assets ( Brav
nd Gompers, 1997; Davila et al., 2003; Engel and Keilbach, 2007;
uri and Zarutskie, 2012 ) or operating performance dimensions as
nnovation ( Hellman and Puri, 20 0 0 ; Kortum and Lerner, 20 01 ;
ngel, 2002 ), employment growth ( Bertoni et al., 2011; Grilli and
urtinu, 2014 ) and productivity ( Chemmanur et al., 2011; Croce
t al., 2013; Croce and Martí, 2016 ). Alternatively, a significant
tream of contributions models positive performance as a dummy
ariable taking the value of one if the VC exits through IPOs or
cquisitions ( Black and Gilson, 1998; Manigart et al., 2002; Cum-
ing and Johan, 2013; Johan and Zhang, 2016 ). However, on the
ne hand, angel-backed companies are generally pre-revenue, and
heir financial accounts are often limitedly informative, up to the
oint that companies can shut down without having generated any
ale or having capitalized significant assets. On the other hand,
arket data on angel-backed companies show that only for a few
f them does the investment cycle end with an IPO or an acqui-
ition. The limited literature on the performance of angel-backed
ompanies has adopted very heterogeneous metrics and measure-
ent methodologies. Kerr et al. (2014) developed three different
ets of measures: first, they built two binary indicators for sur-
ival and success (survival after 4 years from the funding event;
uccessful exit through IPO or acquisition); second, they employed
hree outcome variables for growth (employment, patents, website
raffic); finally, similarly to Collewaert et al. (2010) and Werth and
oeert (2013) , they treated the capability of an angel-backed com-
any to raise subsequent venture financing as a performance mea-
ure. Alemany and Villanueva (2015) investigated the relationship
etween the selection criteria adopted by angel investors and the
ubsequent performance of angel-backed ventures as measured by
heir sales. Cumming and Zhang (2018) chose as a proxy for the
erformance of angel investments their successful exits through
POs or acquisitions. Recently, Levratto et al. (2017) analyzed the
mpact of BAs on firm growth, as measured by the rate of growth
n sales, employment and tangible capital assets. 
In this paper, we first show that traditional performance mea-
ures – namely, firm size and turnover – have very low predictive
ower and that the frequency of successful exits through IPOs or
&As is essentially zero in the three years after the investment,
hus preventing the use of exit-based metrics. We address thisethodological problem by developing an original proxy (“Perfor-
ance Index ”) for the performance and the probability of subse-
uent survival of investee companies. The basic idea behind our
easurement procedure is that it takes time for a small company
eceiving an equity injection to (i) deploy the operating invest-
ents outlined in the fundraising process, (ii) adjust the business
odel and company operations, and (iii) start experiencing cash
nflows, earnings and increase in the equity capital base. As a con-
equence, a common growth path following an equity capital in-
ection implies some years of zero or low revenues, negative prof-
ts and equity capital erosion, followed by an increase in turnover
epending on the beginning of the operations, which could lead
o an increase in earnings, cash flows and dividends, possibly im-
lying a future round of financing and the beginning of a further
rowth path. This pattern may also imply transitory periods of lim-
ted, null or negative net asset value before reverting to both pos-
tive growth and a sustainable business model. Growing or dying
eems to be a crucial node whose major determinants could de-
end on some causal relationships observed in the investment pe-
iod and be tied to specific angel investment practices. 
Following this line of reasoning, our Performance Index is de-
igned as an ordinal variable that can assume five different values
ssociated with five different, measurable company outcomes, cap-
uring differences across the sample on the quality of the funded
entures, based on different combinations of revenues, asset value
nd income. By breaking down our sample according to the per-
entile distribution in each class of the performance index and fo-
using just on the “border” companies, we found further confirma-
ion for discriminating power of our performance metric. 
Since we observe each venture in a time span from t = 0, which
s the year when the BA’s investment occurred, to t = 3, each firm
an change its status one or more times during the observation
eriod. Therefore, the Performance Index is structured as a panel
ariable that dynamically captures changes in the quality profile of
ngel-backed companies. Interestingly, our indicator serves also as
 proxy of the probability of survival because it is reasonable to
ssume that successful ventures should experience a higher prob-
bility of survival over time than ventures obtaining lower scores.
onversely, we would expect ventures showing negative scores to
e future candidates for failure in the subsequent time period. 
Our results show that the performance and the probability of
urvivorship of investee companies are positively affected by the
resence of angel syndicates and by the hands-on involvement of
usiness angels, while they are negatively affected by the monitor-
ng effort, especially for less experienced angels. Furthermore, the
ngel-specific practice of fragmenting the provision of equity in-
estment has a negative impact on the financial performance and
he subsequent probability of survivorship. In a set of robustness
ests, we control for the death or survivorship of the sample ven-
ures after the observation period, and we support the predictive
roperties of our measure, the Performance Index . 
Given the possible presence of several sources of endogene-
ty, we perform different sets of control tests aimed at minimiz-
ng these serious concerns. We begin by using several clustering
nd fixed-effects strategies; second, absent a specific test for cate-
orical regression models, we adopt a control function method to
ddress possible reverse causality issues; third, we build a control
ample of non angel-backed companies and run our model over
he untreated companies showing our treated companies are not
ndogenously better performing than the untreated ones; we con-
lude by looking at a dynamic version of the performance index
o address possible simultaneity issues in our results. Our results
old and support our main conclusions. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the sec-
nd section presents the hypotheses development; sample data
nd variables selected for the empirical analysis are discussed in
330 S. Bonini, V. Capizzi and P. Zocchi / Journal of Banking and Finance 100 (2019) 328–345 
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2the third section, together with descriptive statistics about the
selected angel-backed companies; in the fourth section, we outline
the empirical methodology and present the results of the econo-
metric analysis; in the fifth section we provide evidence for the
robustness tests run as well as for the predictive power of our per-
formance index; in the last section, we present the concluding re-
marks and suggestions for future research. 
2. Hypotheses development 
One major trend observed over time in the market for infor-
mal venture capital is the emergence of co-investments made by
groups of angels, which have led to a transformation of the in-
vestment practices formerly adopted by “solo” angel investors ( Paul
and Whittam, 2010; Gregson et al., 2013; Mason et al., 2016; Bonini
et al., 2018 ). Co-investments could be made through different de-
grees of angel syndicates, ranging from structured BANs to semi-
informal business angel groups (so-called BAGs) or to informal
“club deals” made up on a spot basis just to undertake a single
investment opportunity ( Lahti and Keinonen, 2016 ). 
By co-investing in a given deal, BAs can enjoy the opportunity
to better diversify their investment portfolio and to share the in-
formation and know-how of other more experienced angels. While
in a previous contribution Bonini et al. (2018) found evidence of
a positive relationship between capital invested by BAs and co-
investments, consistent with prior work on venture capital and
private equity ( Lerner, 1994; Brander et al., 2002; Cumming and
Walz, 2010; Tian, 2011 ) in this paper we focus on the effect co-
investing generates on angel-backed companies. In fact, a company
being funded by a syndicate of angels can leverage on a wider set
of monetary and non-monetary contributions than that might be
available from a solo angel, thus increasing both its growth po-
tential and its future probability of survival. 1 A higher number
of angels simultaneously investing means the possibility to im-
mediately start the business with a higher size scale, market po-
tential and an increased probability to get access to subsequent
rounds of financing over time. A further monetary contribution
for the angel-backed company comes considering that investors
can share the burden of the normally high costs of due diligence,
contracting and monitoring required to minimize the adverse se-
lection and moral hazard issues as well as the high agency costs
implicit in so informationally opaque an equity investment. Addi-
tionally, the non-monetary benefits are higher, in that the funded
venture can enjoy multiple sources of coaching and mentoring and
take advantage from each BA’s industrial knowledge, previous en-
trepreneurial and management experience, and relationship net-
works. It is to be highlighted that our arguments are consistent
with a resource-based approach applied to entrepreneurial finance
( Wright et al., 1998; Van Osnabrugge, 20 0 0; Sørheim, 20 03; Wilt-
bank, 2005; Bonnet and Wirtz, 2012; Werth and Boeert, 2013;
Bammens and Collewaert, 2014 ), whose major implication is the
relevant similarities of BAs’ and entrepreneurs’ cognitive processes.
Furthermore, according to Penrose (1959) , the kind of contribution
and growth opportunity a firm can gain from a given investor is
also related to the specific personal experience and learning pro-
cess of the latter, who is path dependent; therefore, experiences
and learning processes differ by investor and, in a context of im-1 We are aware from venture capital literature ( Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Croce 
et al., 2013; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014; Proksch et al., 2017 ) it is possible to further 
investigate the determinants of the performance of investee companies by disen- 
tangling the selection effect from the funding effect and the non-monetary value 
adding contribution. Though our research program – and the associated dataset and 
methodological framework – doesn’t allow to pursue such an understanding deal- 
ing with business angel investments, we address this as a promising area for future 
research. 
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eerfect markets, may constitute significant drivers of future com-
anies’ performance. 
This means that the magnitude of an angel syndicate, as mea-
ured by the number of co-investors in a given deal, implies
 higher quality selection process and a more effective post-
nvestment involvement than those of the ‘solo’ angels, because of
he possibility to leverage on wider experience, knowledge and so-
ial capital. Syndicates included in our dataset are exclusively com-
osed by angels arguably sharing common traits, preferences and
nvestment practices. Some recent contributions ( Cumming and
alz, 2010; Cumming et al., 2018 ) found negative effects of syn-
ication on the capability of the funded companies to successfully
btain subsequent financing rounds. However, these results are ob-
ained looking at “mixed” syndicates where angels and structured
enture capital investors co-invest in the same deals. The hetero-
eneity in the type of co-investors undermines the use of the size
f the syndicate as the main metric, something that doesn’t apply
o our sample. 
We therefore formulate our first research hypothesis. 
1. The performance of angel-backed companies is positively affected
y the number of co-investors joining a given deal. 
As previously noted, a growing trend significantly transform-
ng the angel market is the emergence of business angel associ-
tions. In particular, by affiliating to a given BAN, angel investors
an be offered a wide range of opportunities, first among them,
he possibility to benefit from a higher quality deal flow. Other
ontributions come from the information and knowledge-sharing
ffects taking place inside the community. BAN managers (also
nown as “gatekeepers”) organize periodic training meetings and
itching events aimed at stimulating the interaction between angel
nvestors and entrepreneurs looking for funding ( Aernoudt et al.,
0 07; Ibrahim, 20 08; Paul and Whittam, 2010; Brush et al., 2012;
ason et al., 2016 ). Some angel networks developed own internal
cademies who arrange focused training and education initiatives
argeted to both their own affiliates or to potential entrepreneurs
Josè et al., 2005). In this context, the possibility for inexperienced
ngels to get access to the human capital of experienced angels
nside the BAN is a further valuable opportunity that could subse-
uently increase their capability to contribute to the value creation
rocess of the investee companies ( Shane, 20 0 0 ). In addition, the
uality of the post-involvement contribution given to the angel-
acked venture is enhanced by BAN membership, which gives the
ossibility to finetune and optimize BAs’ decision-making styles ac-
ording to their specific investment behavior in a trust-based en-
ironment, ultimately increasing the probability of the company to
aise additional growth capital ( Wiltbank et al., 2009; Fili et al.,
013; Bonnet et al., 2013; Bammens and Collewaert, 2014 ). 
Such developments in BANs structure and operations have sig-
ificantly increased the networks role that policymakers, suprana-
ional funding institutions and regulators attribute them in boost-
ng and monitoring the startup ecosystems, thus further strength-
ning the opportunities they provide to entrepreneurs and mem-
er angel investors ( Aernoudt et al., 20 07; Mason, 20 09; Collewaert
t al., 2010; Christensen, 2011; Harrison, 2017; Kraemer-Eis et al.,
017 ). 
Overall, these arguments suggest a parallel with major findings
n the literature dealing with social capital ( Coleman, 1988; Gra-
ovetter, 1992 ) when applied to venture capital ( Hsu, 2004; Burt,
0 05; Dimov and Shepherd, 20 05; Hochberg et al., 20 07; Hopp,
010; Alexy et al., 2012 ): a strong social network of business an-
els may generate significant valuable opportunities for business
ngels themselves by granting them access to superior information
bout startups and their possible growth paths within their refer-
nce competitive environment. 
S. Bonini, V. Capizzi and P. Zocchi / Journal of Banking and Finance 100 (2019) 328–345 331 
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2  Unfortunately, given the structure of the available dataset, we
annot build and use some traditionally adopted measures for es-
imating an angel’s embeddedness in a social network, such as the
ize, strength, centrality, specialization and diversification of con-
ections inside a given BAN. However, we reckon that joining a
AN could suggest a willingness to build a social network and take
enefit of its opportunities in terms of both human and social cap-
tal. 
We accordingly formulate our second research hypothesis. 
2. The performance of angel-backed companies is positively affected
y the membership of BAs in a given BAN. 
One fundamental disciplining and monitoring mechanism in
enture capital is “stage financing”, an investment practice con-
isting in fractioning the capital infusion in multiple subsequent
ounds of financing – also called follow-on investments. In this
espect, venture capitalists exploit the option to differ their eq-
ity contributions over time, conditional on the venture reaching
ome target milestones, typically related to financial profitability
size or revenue goals) or technological or scientific achievements
 Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1995; Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Gom-
ers and Lerner, 2001; Tian, 2011 ). However, such a mechanism
enerally implies relatively long time periods – mostly on a pluren-
ial basis – between two financing rounds, and each round is typ-
cally provided to the investee as a single capital contribution. 
Differentiating from the formal venture capital industry prac-
ices, the investment process of business angels is often not com-
leted all at once in a single investment round but is fractioned
nto two or more cash outs and deferred within a time period of
p to 12 months. In other cases, the equity infusion process can be
ragmented into more than two monetary contributions in a three-
ear time period. Such an investment practice depends on several
ossible explanations, one of them being a matter of liquidity of an
ngel’s financial wealth: it could take some time for the BA – who
nvests as an individual subject a share of his own personal wealth
to make available from his investment portfolio the liquid assets
equired to run a single equity capital injection all at once at the
igning of the deal ( t = 0), thus financially constraining the oper-
tions and investments of the angel-backed companies. Second, it
ould be a soft and informal risk management mechanism under-
aken by less experienced angels aimed at generating further infor-
ation about the entrepreneur and the venture prior to increasing
heir involvement in the firm. A third possible explanation could
ddress the degree of involvement of the BA in the funded ven-
ure: BAs desiring to play an active role in the firm would develop
 kind of empathy toward the entrepreneurial project, ultimately
iving them the incentives to increase their investment in the com-
any beyond what they would have offered had the investment not
ollowed a deferred equity infusion pattern. 
However, the kind of companies we are investigating are cap-
tal constrained due to their significantly high intrinsic riskiness
nd cannot finance their investment needs through debt capi-
al or other sources of financing facilities. Thus, the only other
nancing alternative beyond the initial monetary infusion made
y the founders (plus possibly the family and friends tranche) is
onstituted by the intervention of the angel investors. Deferring
heir equity infusion over time could affect the nature, scale and
ime pattern of SMEs’ investments as well as the sustainability
f their business and revenue model, possibly leading to delayed
r compromised cash flow generation. In contrast, investing 100%
f the committed capital at t = 0 could be proof of a high-quality
ntrepreneur-investor relationship, where trust, information disclo-
ure and mutual recognition of each other’s contribution – mone-
ary and non-monetary – play a major role, ultimately positively
ffecting firm’s future performance. 
This leads to the following research hypothesis: 3. The performance of angel-backed companies is negatively affected
y a temporally deferred equity infusion pattern: fractioning the com-
itted equity provision decreases the performance of the investee
ompanies. 
Though in the literature dealing with informal venture capital
esearch on the post-investment involvement is mainly based on
ase studies and anecdotal evidence ( Ardichvili et al., 2002; Poli-
is, 20 08; Macht and Robinson, 20 09 ; Fili and Grünberg, 2016 ), it
s commonly accepted BAs can contribute to their investee compa-
ies beyond their capital investment in several different ways, such
s mentoring the entrepreneur and company managers, expanding
etworking and business opportunities, finetuning the governance
nd the internal control systems. 
Bonnet and Wirtz (2012) and Goldfarb et al. (2014) , consistent
ith a cognitive approach to entrepreneurial finance, argue that
his behavior is driven by the similarities in personal traits be-
ween entrepreneurs and BAs. 
Differently from the controversial findings from the venture
apital industry, the impact of business angels involvement on
ortfolio companies is generally found to be positive. Madill et al.
2005) found a positive relationship between the non-monetary
ontributions provided by the business angels and the possibility
o raise subsequent financing from venture capitalists by the in-
estee firms. Chua and Wu (2012) showed that post-investment
nvolvement – and, more in detail, mentoring, rather than moni-
oring – positively impact business angels’ return on their invest-
ents. Landstrom and Mason (2016) confirm and extend the previ-
us results showing that BAs’ “hands-on” involvement in company
perations can meaningfully add value to the target venture. De-
pite this evidence it is not uncommon to observe BAs adopting
 “hands-off” approach more typical of purely financial investors
 Benjiamin and Margulis, 20 0 0; Mason and Harrison, 2002; Wilt-
ank et al., 2006; Bonini et al., 2018 ). Such behavior, implying a
ilent participation in the company life and operations as well as a
ow deal of the above mentioned non monetary contributions pro-
ided by the “hands-on” active investors, should be associated with
ower performance especially for BAs with a limited potential of
oth human and social capital in that neither co-invest with other
ctive BAs nor join a BAN ( Bonini et al., 2018 ). 
We accordingly formulate our fourth research hypothesis. 
4. The performance of angel-backed companies is positively affected
y BAs’ active involvement over the three-year observed time period. 
One major issue in investing in small, risky, and information-
lly opaque unlisted companies is the possibility of setting up ap-
ropriate monitoring mechanisms to reduce the incentives for op-
ortunistic behavior by the entrepreneur and/or the management
eam of the funded venture. 
The finance literature has extensively investigated the effec-
iveness of a wide number of contingent contracts and financ-
ng mechanisms implemented by venture capital organizations
o decrease asymmetric information and moral hazard problems
 Sahlman, 1990; Triantis, 2001; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Gom-
ers and Lerner, 2004; Wong et al., 2009; Puri and Zarutskie, 2012;
umming and Johan, 2013; Chemmanur et al., 2014 ). 
In the case of angel investing, however, many contributions
ave highlighted the low frequency of such “hard monitoring” pro-
isions due to their excessive design and implementation costs for
elatively smaller equity investments. In such cases, a possible sub-
titute is represented by “soft” monitoring mechanisms such as ge-
graphical proximity, BAs’ knowledge of the industry, experience
ained from previous investments and, most importantly, interac-
ions with entrepreneurs ( Van Osnabrugge, 20 0 0 ; Kelly and Hay,
0 03 ; Wilbank and Boecker, 20 07; Ibrahim, 20 08; Wong et al.,
009; Goldfarb et al., 2014; Bonini and Capizzi, 2017 ). Several im-
332 S. Bonini, V. Capizzi and P. Zocchi / Journal of Banking and Finance 100 (2019) 328–345 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Sampling procedure. 
This table presents details on the filtering process leading to the final sample. From 
a starting sample of 695 deals (Column 1), we exclude observations where the 
name of the target company was not specified or incorrectly specified preventing 
an unequivocal identification (Column 2). We then keep companies for which fi- 
nancial statements and any relevant information on acquisitions and initial public 
offerings is available on Orbis and Lexis/Nexis (Column 3). 
Year of the BA 
investment 
Number of fully 
identified deals 
Panel 
firms 
(2)/(1) (3)/(2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2008 92 10 2 11% 20% 
2009 145 59 12 41% 20% 
2010 137 86 27 63% 31% 
2011 159 74 23 47% 31% 
2012 162 73 47 45% 64% 
Total 695 302 111 43% 37% 
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t  portant contributions however, have strongly highlighted the im-
portance of the “nexus of trust” in the angel/entrepreneur relation-
ship. In particular, Declercq and Sapienza (2006), Strätling et al.
(2012) , and Zacharakis et al. (2010) in the context of venture cap-
ital, Chua and Wu (2012) and Bammens and Collewaert (2014) fo-
cusing on angel investing, have shown that a tightening of the de-
gree of soft monitoring over the investee companies could damage
the trust-based relationship between the founder and the angel
investor, negatively impacting on the mutual perception on each
other’s contribution to the venture, possibly worsening the future
company performance. Following these contributions, we build a
variable labeled “Soft-Monitoring ” (described in the following sec-
tion) capturing the ex-ante degree of information opacity of a pro-
posed deal and formulate the following research hypothesis: 
H5. The performance of angel-backed companies is negatively affected
by BAs’ soft monitoring. 
3. Sample data and variables 
Our data are obtained from sequential surveys administered by
the Italian Business Angels Network Association (IBAN) to its asso-
ciates and other unaffiliated BAs beginning in 2007. The IBAN is the
national trade association for angels and angel groups/networks. A
full description of the survey procedure is reported in Bonini et al.
(2018) . 2 
To investigate how the BA investment decisions affect firm per-
formance and survival, following prior contributions ( Collewaert
et al., 2010; Kerr et al., 2014; Alemany and Villanueva, 2015 ), we
choose to rely upon available data for each firm for an observation
period of at least four years. In particular, we observe each venture
in a timespan from t = 0, which is the year when the BA’s invest-
ment occurred, to t = 3. We therefore select deals in the 2008–2012
IBAN surveys to maximize the availability of financial statements
3 years after the investment for all sample firms that survived 
From a starting sample of 695 deals, we had to exclude a sig-
nificant number of observations because the name of the target
company was not specified or was specified incorrectly, prevent-
ing an unequivocal identification. This reduces the sample to 302
start-ups. We then performed a manual search of two external
data sources, Orbis and Lexis/Nexis, to collect data from financial
statements and any relevant information on acquisitions and ini-
tial public offerings involving the selected ventures. This procedure
returned complete data for 111 firms, whereas for the other 191
firms, it was not possible to obtain a series of three consecutive
annual financial statements. Table 1 reports the details of the fil-
tering process. 
The sample coverage is fairly uniform across the years, with the
exception of 2008, which exhibits a significantly lower number of
deals. This figure is likely due to two different factors. First, 2008 is
the inception year for IBAN surveys. Accordingly, it is not unlikely
that the procedure was refined in the following years. Second, be-
cause of the eruption of the financial crisis, the second half of 2008
experienced a record low number of new firms created. We ad-
dress this possible concern by introducing year fixed-effects in all
regressions that should absorb a significant portion of such hetero-
geneity. Additionally, we run a robustness check on three subsam-2 Each survey is completed in a four-step process: at the beginning of January, 
IBAN forwards the survey’s website link to its associates and other known BAs. 
By the first week of March, the data are collected (step 1). Non-responsive BAs 
are contacted by email and phone to solicit survey completion (step 2), while 
an IBAN team reviews the data to identify incomplete, wrong or unverifiable an- 
swers (step 3), which are further checked through direct follow-up calls (step 4). 
This process is a fairly common survey technique called sequential mixed mode 
( Snjikers et al., 2013 ), and evidence shows that it significantly improves the re- 
sponse rate ( De Leeuw, 2005 and Dillman et al., 2009 ). 
o  
p  
n  
e  
m  
f
p
ples obtained by restricting the year of the BA’s investment. The
esults are qualitatively unchanged. 
In Table 2 , Panel A, we show the industry distribution of the
nal sample data. 
Looking at the industry distribution of investments, deals are
pread out across several industries, with a not surprising domi-
ance of “traditional” sectors for new ventures, such as ICT, elec-
ronics and biotech, which collectively attract approximately half
f the aggregate investments. Interestingly, 13% of the amount in-
ested is directed at cleantech-related ventures, consistent with a
ising global trend of this activity ( Lerner et al., 2016; Mason et al.,
016; Kraemer-Eis et al., 2016 ). 
We report summary statistics on revenues, earnings and net as-
et value in Panel B and for the timespan from t = 0 to t = 3 in
anel C. Considering the revenues, we can observe that many ven-
ures have already started to sell their products or services at t = 0,
hile 13% of firms show zero revenues. It is interesting that 23%
f firms show zero revenues one year after the BA investment, and
% of them are still inactive three years later, confirming that BAs
re patient investors, available to wait for years before the busi-
ess starts its operations and begins generating revenues and cash
ows. Looking at the net asset value, we observe that the aver-
ge assets of approximately 240,0 0 0 euro and maximum assets of
.2 million euro fit the profile of newly funded companies. How-
ver, it is worth noting that several firms show a negative net as-
et value already in the BA’s investment year and that their inci-
ence grows in the subsequent years, consistent with the peculiar
evenues and cash flow generating patterns of companies in the
arly stages of their life cycles that make such companies the pe-
uliar asset class for BAs and venture capitalists ( Gompers, 1995;
ompers and Lerner, 2001; Mason and Harrison, 2002 , Landström
nd Mason, 2016 ). Not surprisingly, about the 75% of the partici-
ated firms show negative net income in the year when the deal
as made. Nevertheless, the incidence of ventures with negative
arnings also remains high in the subsequent years, overcoming
he 70% of the sample in t = 3, which confirms the substantial level
f risk of investments in early-stage companies. 
Measuring performance is a debated issue in the extant en-
repreneurial finance literature. In fact, traditional measures based
n financial variables are almost invariably inadequate to measure
erformance, and if applied, the cross-section is very dispersed and
oisy. 3 Several contributions have tried to tackle this problem by
ither employing some non-financial metrics such as “exits” (Cum-
ing and Zhang, 2018) or the joint analysis of different traditional3 Collewaert et al. (2010) and Vanacker et al. (2013) used the ROA as a proxy 
or performance over two different samples of Belgium angel-backed companies re- 
orting, however, controversial evidence about the quality of such measure for the 
ost-investment value adding contribution provided by BAs. 
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Table 2 
Sample descriptive statistics. 
This table presents details on sample firms characteristics. Panel A presents industry distribution data; Panel B presents 
summary statistics for the 3 main financial indicators: revenues, Net Income and Net Assets, by post-investment year. 
PANEL A- Industry distribution 
Number of firms % 
Biotech 19 17.1 
Cleantech 15 13.5 
Commerce and distribution 10 9.0 
Electronics 17 15.3 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 20 18.0 
Media & Entertainment 10 9.0 
Other sectors 20 18.0 
Total 111 10 0.0 0 
PANEL B - Firms financials by year (euro) 
Mean Std. Dev. Median Freq. < = 0 Freq. > 0 
Revenues 
t0 474,269 1,454,245 67,461 13% 88% 
t1 456,071 1,284,199 57,906 23% 77% 
t2 508,855 1,206,058 81,879 17% 83% 
t3 760,174 1,669,722 149,080 8% 92% 
Net Assets 
t0 240,952 515,146 67,811 6% 94% 
t1 214,796 591,338 66,799 9% 91% 
t2 222,973 772,393 58,663 17% 83% 
t3 240,801 977,414 82,902 18% 82% 
Net Income 
t0 −86,233 261,515 −13,381 75% 25% 
t1 −117,388 294,332 −33,576 80% 20% 
t2 −147,404 271,817 −34,875 72% 28% 
t3 −150,152 304,543 −25,577 71% 29% 
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4 In order to provide further support to the 5 selected categories, in the section 
devoted to the robustness checks we provide supplemental tests of the accuracy 
and predictive power of the P.I.. etrics ( Macht and Robinson, 2009; Levratto et al., 2017 ). Both ap-
roaches have strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, while
xits are undoubtedly an objective measure of success, the num-
er of observed exits is unconditionally small, and when applied
o small samples, the measure may not exhibit sufficient varia-
ion in the left-hand side variable to allow meaningful inferences.
his is, unfortunately, the case in our sample, where we have ev-
dence of only a handful of events that could possibly qualify as
xits in the Cumming and Zhang (2018) sense. On the other hand,
evratto et al. (2017) approach of alternatively employing several
atios comes at a cost of returning conflicting results that may in-
icate success under one metric and failure under another. 
In the light of these constraints, we propose expanding the
ultiple metrics approach by developing an ordinal index based
n commonly accepted measures. Our Performance Index (P.I.),
hose underlying rationale has been developed in the previous
ection 1 of the paper, assumes five different ordinal scores: 
- 2 when revenues, net asset value and net income are positive; 
- 1 when revenues and net asset value are positive but net in-
come is negative; 
- 0 when revenues are positive but net asset value and net in-
come are negative; 
- −1 when revenues are zero and net income is negative but net
asset value is positive; 
- −2 when revenues are zero and net income and net asset value
are negative. 
While it is computationally possible to derive additional alter-
ative combinations of outcomes, we think the 5 selected ones
dentify combinations of financial results that are consistent with
he 5 performance scenarios commonly outlined in financial ac-
ounting literature ( Anthony and Ramesh, 1992; Black, 1998; Fama
nd French, 20 0 0; Nissim and Penman, 20 01; Omrani and Karami,010; Dickinson, 2011 ) and practice ( Damodaran, 2015; Fabozzi
t al., 2015 ). 4 
Since the collection and analysis of firms’ annual reports allow
s to observe the changes in the value of the accounting items over
ime, each firm can change its status one or more times during the
bservation period. Thus, our Performance Index is a panel vari-
ble. 
Table 3 , Panel A presents the detailed frequency distribution of
rdinal values in the observation period from t = 0 to t = 3 showing
hat observations are fairly well distributed over time within the 5
lasses of the P.I.. 
The strength of the P.I. is given by the joint assessment of
ts three main components. In fact, taken individually, revenues,
et assets and net income may yield to substantially diverging
onclusions. In Panel B we highlight this by showing summary
tatistics of the constituents of the P.I. for contiguous compa-
ies across classes. In particular, we compute within-class distri-
ution quartiles of the P.I. constituents and classify companies in
op/bottom quartiles if at least two out of three financial indica-
ors fall in the top/bottom quartile. For example, within each class,
he top/bottom quartile group includes those companies with two
ut of three indicators in the top 25% of the within-class distribu-
ion. We then compare the characteristics of companies ranked in
he borders of each contiguous class of the P.I., so to check for the
iscriminating power of our performance metric. In column (3) of
able 3 , Panel B, we present differences in means and significance
ests for border companies across each P.I. class. Results indicate
hat looking at individual factors only would yield substantially dif-
erent, and often conflicting, classifications of companies. For ex-
mple, the worst companies of the P.I. class 1 exhibit higher rev-
nues but lower asset value than the best companies of the lower
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Table 3 
Performance-Index composition and distribution. 
This table reports summary statistics for the variable PERFORMANCE-INDEX. The variable is designed as an ordinal variable which can assume five different values based 
on different combinations of revenues, asset value and income. We compute the variable on annual basis over a time span from t = 0, which is the year when the BA’s 
investment occurred, to t = 3. The last row reports the number of firms in each year for which the financial statement is missing. PANEL B reports the mean values for the 
variables Revenues, Net Asset and Net Income. PANEL C presents the mean value of Revenues, Net Income and Net Assets for the firms in the contiguous border classes 
(top/bottom 25% distribution) of the perfomance index. Column (3) tests for the inequality of the means between the contiguous borders and presents the differences 
between the means. ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
PANEL A - Performance index composition 
Distribution of ordinal value in T0 to T3 
Description Ordinal Value T0 T1 T2 T3 Total by value 
Net asset value, Net income and Revenues are positive 2 20 20 30 21 91 
Net asset value and revenues are positive but net income is negative 1 47 41 50 41 179 
Both net asset value and net income are negative but revenues are positive 0 3 8 9 20 40 
Net asset value is positive revenues are equal to zero and net income is negative −1 8 31 12 3 54 
Both net asset value and net income are negative and revenues are equal to zero −2 2 1 10 3 16 
Number Firms without financial statement in t n 31 10 0 23 64 
Observation by year 111 111 111 111 4 4 4 
PANEL B - Revenues, Net Assets and Net Income mean values by Performance Index level (euro) 
Revenues Net Assets Net Income 
Ordinal Value (1) (2) (3) 
2 1,338,900 324,379 60,261 
1 363,723 382,008 −189,016 
0 214,584 −705,509 −250,940 
−1 0 245,320 −117,4 4 4 
−2 0 −283,167 −281,719 
PANEL C - Comparison between contiguous borders of different classes of the performance index (euro) 
Bottom border of 
the higher class 
Top border of the 
lower class 
Higher class border vs 
Lower class border 
(1) (2) (3) 
Lower 25% of the performance index = 2 class Revenues 126,025 1,092,697 −966,672 ∗∗∗
vs Net Assets 12,136 897,035 −884,899 ∗∗∗
Upper 25% of the performance index = 1 class Net Income 498 −70,963 71,461 ∗∗∗
Lower 25% of the performance index = 1 class Revenues 6,107 245,760 −239,974 ∗∗∗
vs Net Assets 36,437 −38,122 74,559 ∗∗
Upper 25% of the performance index = 0 class Net Income −49,608 −7,407 −42,201 
Lower 25% of the performance index = 0 class Revenues 64,038 0 64,037 
vs Net Assets −1,585,178 756,714 −2,341,891 ∗∗
Upper 25% of the performance index = −1 class Net Income −522,003 −22,466 −499,536 ∗∗
Lower 25% of the performance index = −1 class Revenues 0 0 0 
vs Net Assets 119,399 −12,551 131,950 ∗∗
Upper 25% of the performance index = −2 class Net Income −328,317 −33,479 −294,838 ∗∗
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t  
i
 
i  
s  
p  
s  
s  
t  
v  
t  
t  
u  
s  
h  
c  
p  
t  class. Similar patterns can be observed in many other instances,
thus clearly indicating that measuring performance of young, start-
up companies through a single metric is inevitably prone to severe
classification problems and that a more comprehensive index as
the one proposed can alleviate such problems. In Section 5.3 we
present further support to this by looking at the ability of the P.I.
to predict survivorship compared with single factors. 
In Table 4 , we present descriptive statistics of the set of the
explanatory and control variables. A full correlation matrix is re-
ported in Table A1 . 5 
We test the first research hypothesis through the variable Co-
investors , which should be positively related to our Performance
Index. This variable assumes values from a minimum of zero to a
maximum of 15 investors. Considering the median and the mean
values, however, we observe that the majority of angel-backed
companies have fewer than five associated investors. 
In our second research hypothesis, we test the impact of BAN
affiliation on performance with the dummy BAN-membership . In5 Caution needs to be employed when dealing with a categorical or binomial de- 
pendent variable, as the interpretation of correlation of such types of dependent 
variables is substantially different than that of continuous dependent variables. 
c  
h
 
i  
t  he presence of co-investors, the variable assumes the value one
f at least one BA participating in the deal shows a BAN affiliation. 
Our third research hypothesis addresses the kind of monetary
njection chosen by BAs, which could be realized either with a
ingle investment round at t = 0 or according to a deferred tem-
oral pattern through fragmented equity injections, though in a
hort time frame (usually less than one year). To generate a mea-
ure of this anomalous and original investment practice, we build
he dummy variable Equity_infusion_pattern , which assumes the
alue of one for ventures that have received two separate capi-
al injections by the same BA. Table 5 presents descriptive statis-
ics for the sample conditional on the value assumed by the Eq-
ity_infusion_pattern variable. The statistics do not support the pos-
ible arguments related to BAs’ wealth and experience, while the
igh share of BAs playing an active role in the business project
ould constitute first descriptive evidence supporting the BA’s “em-
athic behavior argument” toward the entrepreneur. It is also in-
eresting to observe that all the ventures receiving two separate
apital injections already produce positive revenues at t = 0 and
ave positive net asset value but negative net income. 
With the dummy Active involvement , we control for the will-
ngness of the BA to play an active role post his investment with
he aim of providing valuable non-monetary contributions to the
S. Bonini, V. Capizzi and P. Zocchi / Journal of Banking and Finance 100 (2019) 328–345 335 
Table 4 
Independent variables: descriptive statistics. 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the main independent variables and a set of angel-specific and firm-specific controls found in the extant literature to be correlated 
with start-up firm performance. 
Variables Description Obs. Median Mean St. Dev. Min Max Dummy = 1 
percentage 
Co-investors Numbero of co-investors 111 1 3.766 5.1 0 15 
BAN_Membership Dummy = 1 if at least one BA owns to the Italian 
BA Network (IBAN) 
110 53% 
Equity_infusion_pattern Dummy = 1 in presence of different investment 
rounds 
111 5% 
Active Involvement Dummy = 1 if the BA has made managerial 
contributions to the invested firm 
111 68% 
Soft-Monitoring Ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5 98 3 2.95 1.18 1 5 
Angel-specific controls 
Age-BA Average age of the BA/BAs participating to each 
investment 
99 49 48.17 9.56 30 70 
Experience-BA Number of past deals of angel financing. In 
presence of co-investing, it is the number of 
deals of the most expert BA. 
99 7 6.69 3.96 0 12 
Share-BA Share of BAs’ participation in the firm 111 0.08 0.16 0.20 0.01 1 
Firm-specific controls 
Age-Firm Age of the firm at the time of the BA investment 107 1 3.13 4.86 0 27 
Equity Firm’s equity in euro 78 156,872 366,0 0 0 511,221 2,501 2,525,291 
Foreign Dummy = 1 for foreign firms 107 7% 
Pre-Investment Revenues Dummy = 1 if revenue was greater than zero 
when the BAs’ investment occurred 
105 66% 
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics by type of equity infusion pattern. 
In this table we present summary statistics of selected angel and firm characteris- 
tics conditional on the pattern of equity provision modeled as the dummy variable 
Equity_infusion_pattern, which assumes the value of one for those ventures that 
have received an investment by one BA in multiple installments. 
One Capital injection Multiple capital 
injections 
Experience 
Median 7 9.5 
Mean 6.54 8.833 
Min 0 3 
Max 12 12 
Managerial contribution 
(freq) 
0.67 0.83 
Frequencies at t = 0 
Revenues > 0 0.64 1 
Revenues = 0 0.36 0 
Earnings < = 0 0.8 1 
Earnings > 0 0.2 0 
Net asset value < = 0 0.05 0 
Net asset value > 0 0.95 1 
Observations 105 6 
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n  unded venture. Although in the following empirical analysis the
urvey question was primarily framed as a binary response item,
o differentiate between “active” and “passive” angel investors, the
uestionnaires provided interesting additional information, allow-
ng to understand more in detail the nature of the BAs’ involve-
ent. Respondents who elaborated on how they expected to be
nvolved with the venture converged over a few contributions:
haring financial knowledge (32.9%), sharing industrial experience
27.6%), sharing marketing knowledge (22.4%) and offering strategic
nd management advice (75.0%). Unfortunately, detailed responses
ere not sufficient to allow adequate coding of the different re-
ponse items so to include them in econometric analyses; there-
ore we opted for a dummy variable specification. 
To test our final research hypothesis, we built an ordinal vari-
ble ( Soft-Monitoring ) assuming a value from 1 to 5, depending
n the frequency of the visits a BA makes to its portfolio com-
anies ( Bonini et al., 2018 ), where 1 means very limited involve-
ent (no or few company visits) and 5 means high involvement (a
onstant presence in the firm). We want to investigate whether an
ncrease in the monitoring effort is a sufficient and effective valueontributing tool available to BAs or rather a behavior negatively
ffecting the performance of the angel-backed company because of
ts impact on the trust and the quality of the relationship with the
ntrepreneurial team, especially in a context lacking the more for-
al hard monitoring mechanisms that are contractual-based and
ypically implemented in venture capital deals ( Cumming, 2008 ). 
Following the extant literature, we add to our tests a vector of
ontrols capturing BAs’ characteristics. A first series of controls is
ngel-specific and accounts for age, experience – as measured by
he number of past deals – and the share of the equity stake as-
umed by the BA ( Mason and Harrison, 20 0 0; Van Osnabrugge,
0 0 0; Shane, 20 0 0; Paul et al., 2007; Sudek et al., 2008; Macht,
011; Collewaert and Manigart, 2016 ). We expect more profitable
entures to be positively affected by older and more experienced
As. Furthermore, the higher the control in the funded venture
s (either considering the share of the solo angel or considering
he cumulative equity stake of the angel syndicate joining a given
eal), the higher the commitment of the BAs to make more and
ore effective monetary and non-monetary contributions, thus in-
reasing both performance and probability of survival of the angel-
acked company. A second series of controls is firm-specific and
ddresses the company size – as measured by its monetary equity
ase – its age and stage in the life cycle – measured by the positive
alue of revenues before the investment ( t = 0) – and its location
domestic or foreign-based). Consistent with the extant literature,
e expect that the performance of angel-backed companies is pos-
tively affected by their size, age and pre-investment revenue ca-
acity ( Wiltbank et al., 2006; Vanacker et al., 2013; Alemany and
illanueva, 2015; Levratto et al., 2017 ) and negatively affected by
heir location ( Sudek et al., 2008 ). Finally, we complete the model
y considering time and industry fixed effects for their expected
mpact on angel-backed companies’ performance ( Mason and Har-
ison, 2002; Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007; Werth and Boeert, 2013;
err et al., 2014; DeGennaro and Dwyer, 2014; Capizzi, 2015; Ale-
any and Villanueva, 2015; Levratto et al., 2017 ). 
. Methodology and results 
.1. The determinants of the performance of angel-backed companies 
We begin our econometric analysis by performing a set of ordi-
al logistics (Ologit) regressions analysis on our 111 treated firms
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o  observed over a four-year time period, where t = 0 is the year of
the BA’s investment. The dependent variable is the five-stage ordi-
nal variable Performance Index that we test through the following
categorical model: 
y i = BX + F irmControl s + Angel Controls + τ + θ + 
where 
y i = the ordinal response of the Performance Index ( −2; −1, 0, 1,
2). 
X = is a vector of the following explanatory variables: Co-
investors, BAN_membership, Equity_infusion_pattern, Active Involve-
ment, Soft-Monitoring . 
FirmControls = is a vector of the following controls: Age-Firm,
Equity, Foreign, Pre-investment Revenues . 
AngelControls = is a vector of the following controls: Age-BA,
Experience-BA, Share-BA . 
τ and θ are time and industry fixed effects, respectively. 
When dealing with variables characterized by multiple ordered
responses, the previous model is truly 
Pr ( y n < k ) = exp ( X n βk ) 
1 + ∑ K k exp ( X n βk ) 
Accordingly, the regressions return cut-points that capture the
crossing point of the latent variable. 
In all models, standard errors are computed as Huber-White
robust standard errors to allow asymptotically unbiased results,
without having to assume homoscedasticity and normality of the
random error terms. Given that we also introduce time and indus-
try dummies for the most likely cluster levels, we believe that this
approach provides consistent estimations. 
Model results, presented in Table 6 (columns (1)–(3)), show
that a higher number of co-investors positively affects the perfor-
mance of angel-backed companies, thus confirming our first re-
search hypothesis. By getting access to equity capital raised by a
syndicate of BAs, a company can also leverage on a wide set of
non-monetary contributions, leading to an increase in its perfor-
mance and probability of survival. 
The independent variable is statistically significant in each
model specification. Different from our expectation, the affiliation
to a BAN does not seem to affect the probability of success of
angel-backed firms. However, this could be due to the intrinsic fea-
tures of our survey-based dataset, which does not allow the possi-
bility to account for the qualitative differences in the various forms
of potentially existing angel associations. 
One direction for future research, hence, could be the analysis
of the differences in the operations and revenue models as well as
in the quality of the services and contributions that different kind
of BANs offer to their members ( Kerr et al., 2014 ; Landström and
Mason, 2016; Mason et al., 2016 ). 
The dummy Equity_infusion_pattern is negative and strongly sig-
nificant in all model specifications. The interpretation is that frag-
menting an agreed capital contribution into multiple injections sig-
nificantly reduces the performance. It is worth recalling that this
behavior is crucially different from staging in that it pertains to
the delayed provision of an agreed financial investment. Investing
100% of the committed capital in t = 0 is proof of a high-quality
entrepreneur-investor relationship, where trust, information disclo-
sure and mutual recognition of each other’s contribution – mone-
tary and non-monetary – play a major role, ultimately affecting the
firm’s future performance. 
Turning to the results of our analysis, we cannot find support
for our fourth research hypothesis, as BAs’ Active Involvement does
not appear to be statistically correlated with the performance of
angel-backed companies. Differently, Soft-Monitoring turns out neg-
ative and significant in fully specified equations, thus lending sup-
port to hypothesis 5. Looking at the impact of the control variables, model outcomes
how that BAs’ experience, in terms of number of past deals,
as a positive influence on future firm performance, as does BAs’
ge, thus confirming the results of the previously cited empirical
nalyses performed over different geographical samples. Similarly,
chieving good performances in a four-year time period is easier
or firms with low capital intensity than for business projects that
equire greater capital injections. 
As expected, the positive sign of the variable Pre-Investment
evenues confirms that the firms that at t = 0 already sell their
roducts or services are more likely to perform well in the future
han those that still have to develop a viable monetization strat-
gy. The variable Pre-Investment Revenues, however, is likely corre-
ated with firm age and contributes to the definition of the rank-
ng of the Performance Index in t = 0. For these reasons, we run
he main specification by alternatively dropping the age and pre-
nvestment revenue variables. The results presented in models (4)
nd (5) are essentially unchanged. Given that we run ordered lo-
istic regressions, standard intercepts are replaced by cut points,
hich essentially represent the points where the latent response
ariable changes. Absolute values clearly change across specifica-
ions but importantly the distance between cuts (say cut1 –cut2)
s relatively similar across specifications supporting the robustness
f the estimations. 
These results suggest that the contribution to company perfor-
ance by BAs is more effective when it is made by teams of co-
nvestors that include BAs with consolidated experience and capa-
ilities to access better quality deal flow and selection processes. 
.2. Economic interpretation of the ordinal logistic regressions 
Ordinal logistic models are typically less straightforward to in-
erpret than standard OLS models. In fact, the classical approach of
elating the economic effect of a change in the variable of interest
n the dependent variable would lead to misleading estimates, as
ategorical models are non-linear. To provide more intuition of the
conomic effects of the estimates presented in Panel A, in Table 6 ,
anel B, we present predicted probabilities and estimates of the
hanges in probabilities obtained from model 3. 
Quadrants I to III plot the predicted probability of observing a
ositive ( y i = 2) or negative ( y i < = −1) outcome of the Performance
ndex conditional on the three explanatory variables with signifi-
ant estimates. Quadrant I shows that the number of co-investors
ubstantially reduces the predicted probability of a negative out-
ome, which for large groups of co-investors approaches zero (the-
retically). While this does not obviously imply that to avoid neg-
tive performance one should simply add investors to a venture,
t does underscore the importance of the post-investment value
dding contributions that investors bring to a portfolio company,
ost of all the non monetary ones, such as mentoring and net-
orking. Similarly, positive performances are substantially more
ikely in the presence of multiple co-investors, with a predicted
robability that ranges from an unconditional 15% (1 investor) to
lmost 35%. Quadrant II can be interpreted similarly and indicates
hat a fragmented capital provision increases the predicted proba-
ility of observing a negative performance from approximately 10%
o approximately 50%. Similarly, the probability of observing a pos-
tive performance decreases by more than 60%, from more than
0% to less than 10%. In line with the relatively small parame-
er estimated in the regressions, the predicted probability graph in
uadrant III suggests that an intense interaction-based monitoring
s associated with a higher (lower) likelihood of observing nega-
ive (positive) performance. Interestingly, this variable is associated
ith the highest decrease in the probability of observing the high-
st levels of performance, suggesting that a more effective driver
f the performance of a new venture, rather than soft monitoring,
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Table 6a 
PANEL A - Ordinal regressions results. 
The table reports results of a battery of ordinal logit panel regressions of the performance of angel-backed firms. The dependent variable, PERFORMANCE-INDEX, is a five- 
stage ordinal variable taking five possible values: −2 when revenues are zero and net income and net asset value are negative; −1 when revenues are zero and net income 
is negative but net asset value is positive; 0 when revenues are positive but net asset value and net income are negative; + 1 when revenues and net asset value are positive 
but net income is negative; + 2 when revenues, net asset value and net income are positive. Column (1) reports are a reduced model with fixed-effect. Column (2) adds to 
the previous model two more explanatory variables. Column (3) introduces angel-specific and firm-specific controls. In columns (4),(5) we replicate estimations dropping 
alternatively the highly correlated variables Pre Investment-Revenues - that captures whether the firm had revenues before the investment - and Age-firm. Huber-White 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denote significance at the1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Co-investors 0.057 ∗∗ 0.057 ∗∗ 0.064 ∗∗ 0.057 ∗ 0.063 ∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
BAN_Membership 0.306 0.181 0.109 0.303 0.225 
(0.24) (0.32) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) 
Equity_infusion_pattern −1.638 ∗∗∗ −1.584 ∗∗∗ −1.787 ∗∗∗ −1.824 ∗∗∗ −1.971 ∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.41) (0.45) (0.46) (0.44) 
Active Involvement 0.151 0.624 ∗ 0.439 0.479 
(0.27) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) 
Soft-Monitoring −0.09 −0.398 ∗∗∗ −0.317 ∗∗ −0.316 ∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) 
Angel-specific controls 
Age-BA 0.009 0.025 ∗∗ 0.007 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Experience-BA 0.066 ∗ 0.075 ∗∗ 0.079 ∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Share-BA 0.365 ∗∗∗ 0.207 ∗ 0.297 ∗∗
(0.14) (0.12) (0.13) 
Firm-specific controls 
Age-Firm −0.377 ∗∗∗ −0.162 
(0.14) (0.12) 
Equity −0.294 ∗∗∗ −0.225 ∗∗∗ −0.291 ∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Foreign 0.126 0.581 0.254 
(0.60) (0.55) (0.56) 
Pre-Investment Revenues 1.308 ∗∗∗ 0.822 ∗∗
(0.43) (0.38) 
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
cut 1 −3.890 ∗∗∗ −4.046 ∗∗∗ −7.603 ∗∗∗ −6.331 ∗∗∗ −7.129 ∗∗∗
cut 2 −2.109 ∗∗∗ −2.405 ∗∗∗ −5.793 ∗∗∗ −4.569 ∗∗∗ −5.354 ∗∗∗
cut 3 −1.433 ∗∗∗ −1.666 ∗∗∗ −5.304 ∗∗∗ −4.093 ∗∗∗ −4.874 ∗∗∗
cut 4 0.828 ∗∗∗ 0.721 −2.625 ∗∗ −1.449 −2.235 ∗
Pseudo R 2 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09 
N 377 336 303 306 303 
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i  s a trust-based active involvement, not nurtured by increasingly
requent company visit. 
In Quadrant IV, we present marginal effects as a change in the
redicted probabilities for all 5 explanatory variables when the
ariable of interest moves from its minimum value to its maximum
alue. Not surprisingly, changes are small for the variable that re-
urned insignificant. By contrast, the magnitude of change for the
 significant variables is large and economically meaningful. 
. Robustness checks 
.1. Sub-sampling by year, age, revenues, size of investment and 
onitoring 
As a first robustness check, we perform a set of alternative re-
ression analyses on several subsamples to check for possible sam-
le biases. The results are presented in Table 7 . 
BAs’ contribution could be more effective in achieving prof-
tability and survival over time in ventures that are more opaque
nd potentially more innovative than those with an ex-ante higher
bservable quality. To this end, we run our analysis isolating ho-
ogeneous groups of firms in terms of investment year, age, ex
nte quality (as measured by their pre-investment revenue capac-
ty), capital intensity (as measured by their equity endowment)
nd angel-reported monitoring intensity. 
First, we differentiate the whole sample in three different sub-
amples by progressively excluding firms receiving investments onr after 2009, 2010 and 2011. The results confirm that the selected
xplanatory variables Co-investors, Equity_infusion pattern and Soft-
onitoring are significantly related to firm performance and sur-
ival independently of the investment year and therefore indepen-
ently of the kind of angel-investment cycle, which may have ex-
genously changed after the great financial crisis. Looking at the
ubsample of firms invested in after 2011, the parameter for the
ariables BAN_Membership is weakly significant and positive, as ex-
ected from hypothesis 2. We interpret this result as suggestive of
he steep growth and structural changes observed in angel orga-
izations in the second half of 20 0 0 ( Gregson et al., 2013; Mason
t al., 2016 ), that have been progressively improving the quality
nd effectiveness of their operations. 
Second, we create two subsamples on the basis of firm age:
he first subsample, named “start-up ”, includes firms founded two
ears or less prior to the investment. Older firms are coded as “pre-
xisting ”. While the results for Soft-Monitoring are independent on
rm age, we find that the positive effect of Co-investors and the
egative effect of the fragmented capital provision on firm perfor-
ance can be generally attributed to investments in older ven-
ures. Together, this result indicates that the success of investee
ompanies that are no longer in the startup phase is crucially
ependent on the timely provision of capital and the joint non-
onetary contribution of multiple investors. 
Third, we split the sample into two groups of firms consider-
ng the presence of revenues in the investment year. The results
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Table 6b 
PANEL B - Marginal Effects and Predicted Probabilities. 
This table reports predicted probabilities for changes in the three significant explanatory variables in model (3), Table 6-PanelA (quadrants I-III) and marginal effects for all 
5 explanatory variables (quadrant IV). Probabilities are plotted for the highest ( + 2) and two-lowest ( < = −1) values of the Performance Index. Marginal effects are reported 
for changes in the relavant explanatory variable from its Minimum to its Maximum value. 
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v  are qualitatively similar to those observed in the previous sam-
ple breakdown and consistent with research hypotheses 4 and 5.
Furthermore, we find that in ventures with revenues at the time
of investment, the Active Involvement variable is positively related
to the Performance Index , implying that it is most of the all the
hands-on approach, rather than the Soft-Monitoring, that repre-
sents the value-creating contribution business angels can offer to
their investee companies in a framework of mutually transpar-
ent trust-based and pre-determined investment relationships. An
unexpected result is the negative and rather strongly significant
( p < 0.03) impact on firm performance given by BAN_Membership
for firms with no revenues. In the light of the relatively recent
history of BANs as semi-formal organizations, this result may sug-
gest that BANs themselves experience a “learning curve” in invest-
ment selection skills. In unreported regressions, we have further
segmented the sample by restricting the analysis to subgroups of
firms invested in during different periods. The previous results sig-
nificantly weaken, and the results for firms invested in after 2010
disappear, thus confirming our interpretation. However, this result
is far from conclusive, and future extensions are needed to shedcight on the economic effects on performance of business angel
etworks. 
Fourth, we consider the capital intensity of the business, divid-
ng the sample into two subsamples on the basis of the median
alue of the variable Equity. While confirming in both subsamples
he significance and the causal relationships observed for the vari-
bles Equity_infusion_pattern and Soft-Monitoring , the variable Co-
nvestors appears statistically significant only for larger sized in-
estee companies, thus implying that there is a minimum invest-
ent size required to make the presence of an angel syndicate
eneficial. In fact, transaction and coordination costs generated by
he presence of a multitude of investors may exceed the monetary
nd non-monetary contributions provided by co-investors. 
.2. Endogeneity 
Corporate finance studies are unfortunately likely to be biased
ue to several sources of endogeneity. Our analysis is similarly not
mmune from these problems, and while we believe that the sur-
ey data collection process has been designed to minimize these
oncerns, more formal testing is needed. 
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Table 7 
Sub-sample regressions. 
The table reports results of a battery of ordinal logit panel regressions of the performance of angel-backed firms on different sub-samples. The dependent variable, 
PERFORMANCE-INDEX, is a five-stage ordinal variable taking five possible values: −2 when revenues are zero and net income and net asset value are negative; −1 when 
revenues are zero and net income is negative but net asset value is positive; 0 when revenues are positive but net asset value and net income are negative; + 1 when 
revenues and net asset value are positive but net income is negative; + 2 when revenues, net asset value and net income are positive. Investment year regression exclude 
progressively firms that received investment on or after 2009, 2010 and 2011. Firm-age regressions identify as start-up those firms with an age at the time of the investment 
of two years or less. Firm revenues regression partition the sample between firms that have zero or non-zero revenues. Firm equity regressions are run separately on firms 
that exhibit above/below median equity at the time of investment. For table compactness, regression cut points are unreported. Huber-White heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denote significance at the1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Investment year Firm-age Firm-Revenues at t = 0 Firm Equity 
> 2009 > 2010 > 2011 Start-up Preexisting No Revenues Revenues = < Median value > Median value 
Co-investors 0.062 ∗∗ 0.075 ∗∗∗ 0.131 ∗∗∗ −0.034 0.119 ∗ −0.085 0.112 ∗∗∗ 0.027 0.132 ∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
BAN_Membership 0.191 0.302 1.272 ∗ −0.242 1.386 −1.441 ∗∗ 0.454 0.162 0.668 
(0.39) (0.49) (0.67) (0.43) (0.85) (0.63) (0.49) (0.45) (0.68) 
Equity_infusion_pattern −1.844 ∗∗∗ −2.467 ∗∗∗ −3.346 ∗∗∗ −0.525 −2.997 ∗∗∗ −2.615 ∗∗∗ −2.258 ∗ −3.118 ∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.57) (0.74) (0.83) (0.78) (0.56) (1.17) (0.76) 
Active Involvement 0.645 ∗∗ 0.319 −0.485 −0.061 0.923 −0.194 0.838 ∗∗ 0.471 1.206 ∗∗
(0.32) (0.43) (0.64) (0.44) (0.83) (0.58) (0.43) (0.46) (0.55) 
Soft-Monitoring −0.413 ∗∗∗ −0.355 ∗ −0.851 ∗∗∗ −0.314 ∗∗ −1.132 ∗∗∗ −0.208 −0.586 ∗∗∗ −0.728 ∗∗∗ −0.550 ∗∗
(0.12) (0.20) (0.32) (0.14) (0.43) (0.24) (0.17) (0.24) (0.23) 
Angel-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YES 
Firm specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YES 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YES 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YES 
Pseudo R 2 0.11 0.14 0.23 0.08 0.24 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.19 
N 301 220 140 204 99 87 216 155 162 
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tGiven the time and industry distribution of our sample, a first
roblem addresses the existence of unobserved characteristics in
he sample. We have addressed this problem by the tests pre-
ented in Tables 6 A-B and 7 with alternative sets of fixed-effects
nd clustering levels that may partially address these concerns.
nreported results are qualitatively unchanged. However, several
ther sources of bias might be at play, particularly reverse causality
n the two explanatory variables, Equity_infusion_pattern and Co-
nvestors . 
.2.1. Reverse causality and control function regression 
The Equity_infusion_pattern variable might potentially be af-
ected by reverse causality, in that investors may choose to pro-
ide capital in a fragmented fashion only to firms that have an in-
erently higher degree of risk. This concern is partially mitigated
y the evidence found in our previous tests indicating that the be-
avior is particularly negative and significant for pre-existing and
evenue generating companies that are not the lowest performing
entures within the whole sample. However, more careful handling
s needed to convincingly minimize these concerns. 
In the absence of outright tests applicable to categorical depen-
ent variable regressions, an alternative solution that is partially
atisfactory is given by applying a control function regression ap-
roach ( Wooldridge, 2002; Windmejier and Santos Silva, 1997 ) that
nvolves regressing the possibly endogenous variable over a plausi-
ly exogenous instrument, estimating the fitted values, running the
rdinal logistic regressions again and adding the predicted term.
he absence of significance for the residual term is considered a
eliable test of the exogeneity of the variable of interest. 
The instrument for the possibly endogenous variable is the
ummy Low_Wealth, which assumes the value 1 if at least one of
he angels participating in the deal belongs to the lowest wealth
racket of the IBAN survey and zero otherwise. We believe that
he instrument passes the exclusion restriction test, as it is unlikely
hat a personal wealth high enough to qualify the individual as a
usiness angel but lower than that of another investor may have
n impact on the ex-ante quality of the deal. Table 8 presents the
esults of this test for the variable Equity infusion pattern. In column 1, we instrument the possibly endogenous variable
hrough a logit model and estimate the fitted values. In the sec-
nd stage, we estimate the original categorical model adding the
redicted values from the logit regression (Equity infusion pattern
fitted)) to the list of regressors. The results indicate that the fitted
alues are insignificant, while the supposedly endogenous regres-
or is still significant. 
This result significantly mitigates the concerns about the en-
ogeneity of the original variable. However, we reckon that al-
hough this approach is considered acceptable in the literature it
till presents some shortcomings and is certainly less conclusive
han other more traditional approaches. 
A similar, although weaker, causality concern might be raised
or the variable Co-investors . Unfortunately, no valid instrument is
vailable to replicate the approach implemented above. However,
 number of arguments can be put forth to address this possible
ssue. For this argument to be valid, we would need to observe
 significantly different distribution of high/low performance deals
onditional on the level of co-investment. We addressed this idea
y inspecting the composition of the angel syndicates in our sam-
le. The data indicate that we have an almost perfectly balanced
resence of co-investors in both successful and unsuccessful cases.
n fact, we have evidence of the presence of angel syndicates in
ore than 50% of the dead firms, although the difference is not
tatistically significant. Additionally, in a non-negligible 10% of the
ases, we find evidence of the same group of angels being involved
n both successful companies and defaults. 
While not fully conclusive, this evidence provides a solid argu-
ent against reverse causality for the variable Co-investors . Inter-
stingly, we notice that this same evidence may hint at the exis-
ence of a possible “matching” problem in the early-stage financ-
ng market. The significant informational opaqueness may in fact
ranslate also in a suboptimal access to investment opportunities
nd funding for investors and entrepreneurs respectively. This in-
uition seems consistent with anecdotal evidence but is completely
bsent in the literature. We envision this as a possible area of fur-
her research. 
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Table 8 
Control function regressions. 
In this table we present results of a control function methodoloy test for the endogeneity of the independent variable "Equity infusion 
pattern". Given that the dependent variable is ordinal and regressions are categorical, we present results of a control function approach 
where we first instrument the possibly endogenous variable through a logit model and we estimate the fitted values ( Wooldridge, 2002; 
Windmejier and Santos Silva, 1997 ). In the second stage we estimate the original categorical model adding the predicted values from 
the logit regression. The instrument for the possibly endogenous variable is the dummy Low_Wealth which assumes value 1 if at least 
one of the angels participating to the deal belongs to the lowest wealth bracket of the IBAN survey and zero otherwise. Huber-White 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denote significance at the1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
Instrument = Low_Wealth 
Step 1 Y = Equity Infusion Pattern Step 2 Y = Performance Index 
Low_Wealth 3.188 ∗∗
(1.25) 
Co-investors 0.112 ∗∗∗
(0.03) 
BAN_Membership 0.418 
(0.54) 
Equity_infusion_pattern −2.775 ∗∗∗
−0.581 
Equity_infusion_pattern (fitted) 0.115 
(0.14) 
Active Involvement 0.677 
(0.45) 
Soft-Monitoring −0.555 ∗∗∗
(0.17) 
Age-BA 0.592 ∗∗ −0.004 
(0.24) ( −0.47) 
Experience-BA 0.736 ∗∗ 0.022 
(0.29) (1.04) 
Share-BA −0.228 0.180 ∗∗
(0.30) (2.29) 
Age-Firm 0.347 ∗∗ −0.318 ∗∗∗
(0.14) ( −3.21) 
Equity 1.153 ∗∗∗ −0.095 ∗∗
(0.26) ( −2.14) 
Foreign 3.013 ∗∗∗ −0.062 
(1.00) ( −0.17) 
Pre-Investment Revenues 
Time-effect No Yes 
Industry-FE No Yes 
cut 1 −7.603 ∗∗∗
cut 2 −5.793 ∗∗∗
cut 3 −5.304 ∗∗∗
cut 4 −2.625 ∗∗
Pseudo R 2 0.53 0.17 
Observations 212 209 
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t  5.2.2. Selection bias 
A possible concern in our analysis is that angel-backed compa-
nies are intrinsically better performers than their peers. Our anal-
ysis focuses on how some investor characteristics impact the per-
formance of invested companies, thus selectivity is relatively less
severe a concern than in other contexts. However, we try and ad-
dress this issue by identifying a plausibly matching sample of non
angel-backed start-ups and then comparing their pre-investment
financial characteristics with those of our sample companies. We
identify similar firms by selecting from the Amadeus/Bureau van
Dijk database, companies established between 1997 and 2012. We
then selected companies in the same industry and size bracket,
and with total assets lower than 3.5 million euro in t 0 , where t 0 
is measured as the foundation year for startups that received an-
gel investment in their first year and the age of the firm at the
time of the angel investment for preexisting companies. We ob-
tained a population of roughly 170.0 0 0 companies, from whom we
randomly selected 120 matching firms with the same proportion
of new ventures (65%) vs. preexisting firms (35%) of our angel-
backed sample. As a final control, we looked in detail at the own-
ership structure of the selected companies aimed at excluding the
presence of angel or financial investors through a manual inspec-
tion on the Italian Register of Enterprises filings. More in detail,onsistent with a widely accepted definition of business angels, we
dentified as business angels investors with minority equity hold-
ngs in three or more ventures. We found two companies not pass-
ng such exclusion criterion, leading to our final control sample of
18 non angel-backed firms. 
We fully reckon this is not a perfect matching exercise but we
elieve it provides sufficient generality to address the concern of
electivity in our tests that are focused at capturing the effects
f angels characteristics on investee firms rather than comparing
ngel-backed vs. non-angel-backed companies. 
Table 9 , Panel A presents evidence of the sampling procedure
rocess. Table 9 , Panel B and C, offers descriptive statistics for
oth the treatment and the control sample, allowing to observe
he confirmed statistically significant similarity in t0 between the
wo sample as far as both industry distribution and business fun-
amentals are concerned. Not surprisingly, the net asset value of
he angel-backed companies is higher than that observed for the
ontrol sample companies, as a consequence of the funding contri-
ution given by BAs. 
Overall, this evidence mitigates the selectivity concern at least
ith regards to observable factors. Of course, it is fully possible
hat firms have some unobservable characteristics that dispropor-
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Table 9 
Control sample descriptive statistics. 
This table presents details on control-sample firms characteristics. Panel A presents the sampling procedure. Panel B offers industry distribution data; Panel C compares firms 
charateristics in t0 between the control sample and the angel backed sample and, in column (3), presents the differences between the means. ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
PANEL A- Sampling procedure 
Population Total Asset < = 3.5 M € Selected sectors Raw control sample Final control sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Founding year 2008–2012 339,602 160,872 83,004 78 76 
Founding year 1997–2007 591,853 304,208 85,942 42 42 
Total 931,455 465,080 168,946 120 118 
PANEL B- Industry distribution 
Control sample Angel backed sample Control vs angel backed sample 
(1) (2) (3) 
Biotech 10.2 17.1 −6.9 
Cleantech 13.6 13.5 0.1 
Commerce and distribution 10.2 9.0 1.2 
Electronics 6.8 15.3 −8.5 ∗∗
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 14.4 18.0 −3.6 
Media & Entertainment 12.7 9.0 3.7 
Other sectors 32.2 18.0 14.18 ∗∗
Total 10 0.0 0 10 0.0 0 
PANEL C - Firms characteristics in t 0 
Control sample Angel backed sample Control vs angel backed sample 
(1) (2) (3) 
Firm age 2.3 3.1 −0.8 
Total asset 681,047 1,023,601 −342,554 
Revenues 556,131 474,269 81,862 
Net asset value 136,682 240,952 −104,270 ∗
Net income 11,892 −86,233 98,124 ∗∗
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Table 10 
Performance index dynamics. 
The table reports results of tests of the effets of the main explanatory variable on 
the dynamic of the performance index. Regressions are multinomial logistic regres- 
sions of the 1-year and 3-years changes in performance index. The dependent vari- 
able can take value of: −1 if the performance index drops by one or more notches 
over the next year or the next 3 years; 0 if the performance index is unchanged; + 1 
if the performance index increases by one or more notches over the next year or 
the next 3 years. The baseline outcome is 0 (no change). Huber-White heteroscedas- 
ticity consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
1-year change 3-years change 
−1 1 −1 1 
Co-investors −0.120 ∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.186 ∗∗ −0.012 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) 
BAN_Membership 0.721 0.672 0.179 0.425 
(0.54) (0.56) (0.66) (0.70) 
Equity_infusion_pattern 1.930 ∗ 1.301 3.017 ∗ −14.963 ∗∗∗
(0.99) (0.95) (1.82) (1.15) 
Active Involvement −0.228 −0.442 −1.079 ∗ −0.867 
(0.58) (0.51) (0.62) (0.73) 
Soft-Monitoring −0.231 −0.375 ∗ −0.369 0.362 
(0.22) (0.21) (0.31) (0.27) 
Angel-specific controls Yes Yes No No 
Firm specific controls Yes Yes No No 
Time FE Yes Yes No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.706 1.784 0.525 −2.935 ∗∗
(2.18) (2.19) (1.03) (1.28) 
Pseudo R 2 0.20 0.25 
N 214 96 
n  
d
 
t  
a  ionately attract investors and somewhat affect our sample selec-
ion. 
.2.3. Simultaneity and performance index dynamics 
An additional source of endogeneity might be given by simul-
aneity. We address this issue by adopting a modified version of
ur Performance Index that, rather than looking at levels, estimates
he effects of our explanatory variables on changes in the P.I. one
r three years after the investment. We model changes in the Per-
ormance Index as a trinomial variable that takes the value of −1
f the P.I. drops by one or more notches over the next year or the
ext 3 years; 0 if the Performance Index is unchanged; and + 1 if
he P.I. increases by one or more notches over the next year or the
ext 3 years. The results are reported in Table 10 . 
While the estimates are weakened by the substantially re-
uced sample size, especially on the 3-year window, the results
re aligned in sign with those of the main regressions and largely
aintain significance across the response categories, thus support-
ng our main conclusions. 
.3. The predictive power of the performance index 
As previously discussed, our three-year Performance Index
ould be used as an effective proxy for estimating the proba-
ility of survival of angel-backed firms. To this end, we created
 dummy variable, “Survival”, assuming the value one for those
rms that have survived (i.e., have not been liquidated or filed for
ankruptcy) four years after the initial investment, or zero other-
ise. We gathered this information from the Orbis and Lexis/Nexis
atabases, augmented by manual Google and LinkedIn company
rofile searches. We then run a set of logistic regressions on the
ependent variable Survival against our main explanatory variable,
erformance Index. Following Levratto et al. (2017) , we run alter-ative specifications using Total Assets and Total Revenues as pre-
ictors. 
The results in Table 11 PANEL A support the effectiveness of
he P.I. as a predictive measure of the probability of survival of
n angel-backed firm. Differently, traditional financial measures do
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Table 11 
Performance measures and survival. 
In this table we present results for a set of logistic regression estimating the survival of firms from our main performance measure - Performance Index - and two traditional 
measures of performance, all measured in t0. The dependent variable is a dummy assuming value one for those firms that have survived (i.e. have not been liquidated or 
filed for bankruptcy) four-year after the intial investment, or zero otherwise. We alternatively specify the main explanatory variable as follows: Performance Index, Total 
Assets and Total Revenues. All regressions include Industry Fixed Effects. Huber-White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and 
∗ denote significance at the1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
PANEL A - SURVIVAL 
(1) (2) (3) 
Angel-backed Sample Control Sample Angel-backed Sample Control Sample Angel-backed Sample Control Sample 
Performance-Index 0.623 ∗∗ 0.359 ∗
(0.29) (0.191) 
Total Assets −0.163 0.038 
(0.18) 0.141 
Revenues 0.081 0.032 
(0.06) 0.043 
Industry-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.759 0.682 ∗∗ 3.497 0.557 0.49 0.728 
(0.53) (0.341) (2.48) (1.764) (0.76) (0.495) 
Pseudo R 2 0.159 0.06 0.131 0.03 0.119 0.04 
N 80 114 80 114 80 114 
PANEL B - DETERMINANTS OF SURVIVAL 
Co-investors 0.234 ∗
−0.126 
BAN_Membership 2.307 ∗
(1.322) ∗
Equity_infusion_pattern −4.561 ∗
−2.343 
Active Involvement −0.498 
(1.281) 
Soft-Monitoring 0.16 
(0.264) 
Angel-specific controls Yes 
Firm specific controls Yes 
Time FE No 
Industry FE Yes 
Intercept −5.384 
(6.382) 
Pseudo R 2 0.505 
N 66 
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f  not appear to have substantial predictive power. Interestingly, we
obtain qualitatively similar results when using the control sample
which, on one side mitigates selectivity concerns of the main sam-
ple and on the other side further support the P.I. rationale. These
results are consistent with the arguments we have put forth moti-
vating the development of a more comprehensive measure of per-
formance that can better disentangle the peculiar financial patterns
usually observable in young ventures. 
In the light of our previous results on the determinants of the
P.I., in Panel B, we run a logistic regression with the same set of
independent variables used in our main specification ( Table 6 A,
Model 3). The results confirm the outcome of our base model:
Co-investing actually increases the probability of surviving over
time, while deferring the equity injection by the BA in subsequent
time periods increases the probability of a future company closing
down. Additionally, we observe that the probability of close down
increases with the firm age. Interesting to highlight, BAN affilia-
tion shows a negative relationship with company failure, suggest-
ing that, at least for the worst performing companies, membership
in a given BAN is positively correlated with the survival of angel-
backed companies, consistent with research hypothesis 2. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we provide previously unavailable evidence on
the post-investment performance and probability of survival ofngel-backed companies conditional on an original set of indepen-
ent variables related to business angels’ investment practices ( Co-
nvestors, BAN_Membership, Equity_infusion pattern, Active Involve-
ent, Soft-Monitoring ). Contributing to the extant literature, we in-
roduce an innovative ordinal metric (“Performance Index”) that
e use as a dependent variable differentiating companies accord-
ng to their revenue and profit generation pattern. 
We base our research hypotheses on a sample of 111 angel-
acked companies extracted from a unique database containing
ualitative and quantitative information on 690 deals made by 380
usiness angels on roughly firms, during the period 2008–2012.
ur main results show that the performance and the probabil-
ty of survivorship of investee companies are positively affected
ostly by the presence of syndicates of co-investing angels, indi-
ating their ability to generate a higher quality deal flow and selec-
ion process while offering to funded ventures a wider set of non-
onetary contributions, crucial to survivorship and future growth. 
Looking at the survivorship of companies, we show that our
erformance Index offers substantial predictive power, being able
o predict survival up to four years after the investment. We also
rovide evidence that the membership in a given BAN is posi-
ively correlated with the survival of angel-backed companies, in
articular for the weakest performing companies of the sample,
nd that equity capital should be provided at once, rather than
ragmented in multiple disbursements. We interpret this result as
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B  ollows: the immediate investment of the total committed capital
s a signal of a high-quality relationship between the investee com-
any and the angel investors, where the former has been able to
ully disclose information about the company and the projected in-
estments, and the BA, thanks to its experience, has been able to
rovide the required capital together with the right incentives. Fi-
ally, BAs’ active involvement seems to constitute a value-creating
echanism that is more effective than soft monitoring (based on
ompany visits rather than on the formal contractual provisions set
p by venture capitalists) in driving the angel-backed companies to
rofitability and survival; this is especially true for funded ventures
ith yet limited revenue capacity at the investment period. 
These results indicate that valuable BA investments need to be
haracterized by a balanced blend of investment practices, net-
orking skills, background experience and investment style. This
angel investment formula” is more effective in generating positive
erformance than a stand-alone capital contribution. 
One consequent policy implication aimed at further boosting
he entrepreneurial environment of a given country could be the
esign of focused financing facility schemes leveraging on the
alue adding potential of BAs, such as, for example, the creation of
ublic-private angel co-investment funds. Furthermore, it has to be
mphasized the opportunity to recognize and incentivize the piv-
tal role angel networks could play in the startup ecosystem, given
heir intrinsic potential as mechanisms for sharing among BAs in-
ormation, experience and knowledge. 
Summing up, our results provide the first evidence of the
erformance of angel-backed companies, overcoming the severe
ata limitations affecting previous studies. However, several areas
ay benefit from further analytical improvement. First, more de-
ailed data and longer time series may allow more structured sur-
ival analyses such as the Cox proportional hazards model, as in
anigart et al. (2002) and Pommet (2012) . Second, the differential
mpact on the performance of angel groups and networks has only
een marginally explored in this study. More evidence is needed to
ighlight whether and how different association rules, membership
nd services structures and BAN management practices can affect
he survival and performance of new ventures. Third, additional in-
ights may come from the collection of additional variables captur-
ng more granularly angel investment practices such as: BAs previ-
us investment experience, the different personal background of
As, and the type of securities contracts underwritten when fund-
ng a company. We leave these issues as suggestions for future re-
earch. 
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